Iran's political economy: The link between Anfal, rent, and power

An analysis of the Iranian political economy examines the intersection of wealth, power, and capital accumulation within the Velayat-e Faqih system. The discussion highlights that the economy cannot be simplified into a binary of state versus market, as it simultaneously involves public ownership of natural resources, private sector activity, state and quasi-state enterprises, and oil-based economics.

A central focus is the concept of ‘Anfal,’ a jurisprudential term integrated into the legal structure of the Islamic Republic. Under Article 45 of the Constitution, Anfal and public wealth are placed under the authority of the Islamic government to be managed in the public interest. However, the analysis suggests a disconnect between public ownership and public political authority. While resources are nominally public, decision-making power remains centralized, often preventing effective societal oversight regarding the exploitation, allocation, and consumption of revenues.

This centralization leads to rent-seeking behaviors, where unequal access to land, mines, projects, and privileges creates economic advantages. The analysis argues that without democratic mechanisms for transparency and accountability, public ownership may serve merely as a legal title while the actual political and economic control remains concentrated within the state structure.