Judicial independence trends in Hungary and Germany

Legal experts and analysts are contrasting the state of judicial independence in Hungary and Germany. In Hungary, lawyer György Magyar argues that the Constitutional Court has been weakened by political loyalty rather than professional merit. He suggests that the current system of appointing judges allows the ruling power to select individuals who will make decisions favorable to the government in sensitive situations.

Magyar proposes a complete overhaul of the selection process, advocating for a system where the President, government, civil organizations, and professional bodies can nominate candidates to be reviewed by an independent committee. He notes that as several mandates expire, there is a potential opportunity to shift the court's composition back toward a role of genuine constitutional oversight.

In contrast, Germany has moved to strengthen its democratic institutions. While Hungary's 2012 constitutional amendments limited the Constitutional Court's ability to review the constitutionality of constitutional amendments, Germany recently updated its Basic Law in 2024 to provide more effective protection for its Federal Constitutional Court against authoritarian challenges. The German model emphasizes robust checks and balances through various legal procedures, including constitutional complaints available to individuals and legal entities.