Indus Waters Treaty scrutiny highlights asymmetric obligations favoring Pakistan

The Indus Waters Treaty, signed in 1960 with World Bank facilitation, allocated the three eastern rivers (Sutlej, Beas, Ravi) to India and the three western rivers (Indus, Chenab, Jhelium) to Pakistan. Under the agreement India received about 33 million acre‑feet of water annually, while Pakistan obtained roughly 135 million acre‑feet, effectively giving it around 80% of the basin’s flow.

Critics argue the treaty reflects an imbalance: India abandoned planned water‑development projects on the Indus and Chenab, accepted limits on storage, irrigation and hydro‑project designs, and transferred funds to Pakistan for irrigation infrastructure. Pakistan delayed formal acceptance of the pact until 1958 and continued expanding its own water infrastructure, leading analysts to describe the deal as a “weapon” used by Pakistan.

Supporters maintain the treaty provides a predictable framework that has endured despite wars, noting that India is allowed non‑consumptive uses such as run‑of‑river hydropower, subject to technical conditions. Disputes over Indian projects like Baglihar and Kishanganga have been handled through treaty‑based arbitration, but tensions over compliance and fairness persist.