Russia‑Ukraine drone conflict

Since early July 2026, Russia has expanded its use of tethered, fibre‑optic‑guided drones and legacy air‑defence radars such as the Soviet‑era 5N84A Oborona‑14, while Ukraine has intensified its own UAV strikes against Russian‑controlled power infrastructure and radar sites. NATO has warned that the rapid growth of Russian drone capabilities raises provocation risks for the Baltic states and Poland. On 12 July, Poland placed its Bełchatów coal‑fired power plant—supplying over 70 % of national electricity—on heightened security (BRAVO alarm) after U.S. officials warned of possible Russian drone attacks and limited NATO incursions. Joint military‑police exercises simulated strikes on the plant, reflecting concerns that Moscow may test alliance resolve with false‑flag operations or airspace violations. Analysts note that Russia’s strained defence budget has forced reliance on modernised Soviet equipment, including continued deployment of Oborona‑14 radars and the mounting of helicopter‑type machine guns on trucks. The war’s attrition has reduced Russia’s tank fleet by more than 3 000 modern T‑80/T‑90 units, accentuating its improvisation. Ukraine reported foiling a drone attack on a Russian airfield and conducting Su‑27 strikes in Donetsk, underscoring the widening geographic scope of the drone‑centred contest and its implications for NATO’s eastern flank. U.S. military analyst Michael Kofman, speaking on 12 July, reiterated that Russia could prepare a large‑scale attack on a NATO member within five to seven years after the Ukraine war ends. He highlighted that defense spending now consumes roughly 40 % of the state budget (8‑10 % of GDP), that the armed forces are a “patchwork” of modernised precision‑strike and drone‑production capacity (up to 100 000 units annually) alongside degraded legacy assets, and that discussions are ongoing about possible tactical nuclear use.